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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND CASE HISTORY 
The Utah State Court of Appeals has appellate 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §78-2a3(2)(j), Utah Code 
Annotatedf (1953 as amended). The nature of the proceedings below 
involve a damages suit against the defendants as a result of their 
issuing corporate checks as managing officers and directors of the 
corporation to the plaintiff that were subsequently dishonored 
upon presentment. 
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Do partial payments of a debt obligation toll the 
statute of limitations to the date of the last partial payment 
pursuant to §76-12-44, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)? 
2. Does §78-12-40, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended) provide one year from the dismissal of the Complaint in 
the United States District Court for lack of federal jurisdiction? 
3. Can the District Court determine basis for granting 
Summary Judgment in the nature of waiver and laches, when said 
basis were not raised in the Defendants1 (moving party) Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment? 
4. Does actual "in person" notice satisfy the notice 
requirements of §7-15-1, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as 
amended)? 
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III. DETERMINITIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, §7-15-1, et. seq., as amended (See 
addendum). 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-40, as amended: 
If any action is commenced within due 
time and a judgment thereon for the 
plaintiff is reversed, or if the 
plaintiff fails in such action or upon 
a cause of action otherwise that upon 
the merits, and the time limited either 
by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, 
or if he dies and the cause of actions 
survives, his representatives, may 
commence a n*>w action within one year 
after the reversal or failure. 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-44, as amended: 
In any case founded on contract, when any 
part of the principal or interest shall 
have been paid, or an acknowledgement of an 
existing liability, debt or claim, or any 
promise to pay the same, shall have been 
made, an action may be brought within the 
period prescribed for the same after such 
payment, acknowledgement or promise; but 
such acknowledgement or promise must be in 
writing, signed by the party to be charged 
thereby. When a right of action is barred 
by the provisions of any statute, it shall 
be unavailable either as a cause of action 
or ground of defense. 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff, Pioneer Credit Union, formerly known as 
EIML Credit Union, (Pioneer) appeal from a Summary Judgment in 
favor of the defendants entered by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, 
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Third Judicial District Judge, on February 6, 1990. 
Plaintifffs Complaint asserts three causes of action. First, 
for payment of unpaid wages pursuant to §34-28-3, Utah Code 
Annotated; second, for fraud; and, third for damages caused by 
the issuance of the bad checks, incorporating Sections 7-15-1, 
et. seq., and 34-28-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
All three causes of action arise out of the 
defendants' acts as managing officers and agents of IML Freight, 
Inc., whereby the defendants issued corporate checks to the 
plaintiff pursuant to a well established payroll deduction plan 
for employees' wages. Pioneer relied upon the established 
procedure and credited the employees' accounts for the payroll 
deductions. When Pioneer presented the checks for payment, they 
were dishonored for insufficient funds. Subsequent payments 
were made by the defendants as managing officers and agents of 
the corporation to the plaintiff until the corporation filed a 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy on or about July 15, 1983. 
V. PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
1. Plaintiff filed the complaint in the State Court 
on or about January 17, 1987. The defendants were served with 
Summons and Complaint on or about January 19, 1987. (Page 2). 
la. On or about July 1, 1986, plaintiff filed an 
action against the defendants in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, including 
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three pendant state claims which are the three cause of action 
reasserted by the plaintiff in the state court action described 
in paragraph 1. On or about January 14, 1987, the United States 
District Court made and entered a Judgment and Order of 
Dismissal, dismissing the case upon the grounds and that the 
court had no jurisdiction to grant the federal relief sought and 
that since there was no federal claim over which the court had 
jurisdiction, the pendent state claims were also dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
2. The defendants, on or about February 17, 1987, 
filed an Answer to the Complaint. (Page 12). 
3. Plaintiff, on or about August 30, 1989, filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Page 82). 
4. On or about October 3, 1989, the defendants filed 
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Page 161). 
5. On or about November 20, 1989, a hearing was held 
before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno on the cross motions for 
Summary Judgment. Oral argument was given by counsel for the 
plaintiff, however because of insufficient time, oral argument 
for the defendants was continued to Wednesday, December 6, 1989. 
(Order, dated December 6, 1989, page 197). 
6. Oral argument was given by defendants on or about 
December 6, 1989, on the cross motions for Summary Judgment. 
(Order dated December 6, 1989, page 197). 
-4-
7. The Third Judicial District Court, on December llf 
1989 made and entered its Order denying plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (Page 197). 
8. The defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
was taken under advisement and the parties were granted the 
opportunity to file further written memoranda with the court. 
(Order dated December 11, 1989, page 197). 
9. Plaintiff filed its Response to Defendants' Oral 
Argument in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on or about December 20, 1989. (Page 201). 
10. Defendants filed their Memorandum in Response to 
Plaintiff's Memorandum dated December 20, 1989 and Final 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (Page 233). 
11. The Third Judicial District Court, on or about 
January 9, 1990, entered a "Minute Entry" granting Defendants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and instructed Defendants to 
prepare the Order. (Page 258). 
12. Plaintiff filed its Amended Objection to 
Defendants' Proposed Order on or about January 24, 1990. (Page 
264). 
13. Plaintiff acknowledged and stipulated that if the 
District Court entered the Summary Judgment as proposed by the 
Defendants, that the basis set forth therein for Summary 
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Judgment would also provide basis for the dismissal of 
Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action, for fraud, although not 
included in the original Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
(Page 265). 
14. The Third Judicial District Court entered Summary 
Judgment in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff, "NO 
CAUSE OF ACTION", on February 6, 1990. (Page 271). 
15. Plaintiff, Pioneer Credit Onion, filed its Notice 
of Appeal on February 28, 1990. (Page 298). 
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The defendants were managing executive officers 
and agents of the corporation, IML Freight, Inc. (IML). 
Defendant Lee served as Chairman of the Board of Directors and 
as Chief Executive Officer, defendant Price served as Chief 
Financial Officer, and defendant Schofield served as Executive 
Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer. (Lee affidavit, 
para. 2, page 151; Price affidavit para. 2, page 145; 
Defendants1 Memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, para. 3, page 115; Summary Judgment, para. 2, 
page 273). 
2. Plaintiff, Pioneer Credit Union, provided credit 
union services to the employees of the corporation including 
payroll deduction. (Summary Judgment, para. 3, page 274). 
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3. IML agreed to and did participate with the credit 
union and employees of IML in a voluntary payroll deduction 
plan, whereby the employees who so elected had a portion of 
their earnings deducted from their checks for deposit with 
Pioneer for credit to the accounts of the respective employees. 
(Rico affidavit, para. 4, page 94; Summary Judgment, para. 4, 
page 274). 
4. The payroll deduction plan and procedure was well 
known by each of the defendants in their respective positions 
with the corporation. (Rico affidavit, para. 5, page 94). 
5. These payroll procedures continued successfully 
and in full effect from approximately 1959 until 1983 when IML, 
through the defendants as managing officers and agents of the 
corporation, failed to pay the wages to Pioneer that are in 
dispute in this case. (Rico affidavit, para. 4, page 94; 
Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants1 First Set of Interrogatories 
Answer 10, page 58). 
6. For the payroll periods ending February 8, 
February 15 and February 22, 1983, under the direction of the 
defendants, IML sent a computer listing to Pioneer, whereby 
Pioneer credited the participating members/employees accounts. 
(Rico affidavit, para. 4, page 94; Plaintiff's Answer to 
Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories, Answer 10, page 58). 
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7. Under the direction of and by the defendants, IML, 
sent three (3) checks for the respective pay periods described 
in paragraph 6 that were signed by the defendants Lee and Price, 
totalling $245,163.00. (Summary Judgment, para. 5, page 274? 
Rico affidavit para. 7, page 94). 
8. The checks were then dishonored upon presentment 
by Pioneer and returned for insufficient funds to Pioneer. 
(Summary Judgment, para. 6, page 274). 
9. Subsequent to the payroll periods described in 
paragraph 6, in personal discussions with Mr. Fred Rico, 
President of Pioneer Credit Union, Pioneer informed defendants 
that the checks had been dishonored upon presentment. 
(Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories, 
Answer 27, page 65). 
10. Defendants indicated to Pioneer (Mr. Rico) that 
the deficient payroll amounts would be made up at some future 
time. (Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants1 First Set of 
Interrogatories, Answer 27, page 65). 
11. Pioneer was promised that the total amount due 
would be paid by the following Friday. When this did not 
happen, Pioneer was advised that payment would be paid by the 
next Tuesday, or approximately four days later. (Plaintiff's 
Answer to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories, Answer 27, 
page 65). 
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12. At the subsequent Tuesday meeting, Pioneer was 
informed by the defendants that IML could not pay the amounts 
due to Pioneer at that time, but that Pioneer would be paid the 
amount that Pioneer had credited the employee/members1 accounts 
at the rate of $10,000.00, or more, per week. (Plaintiff's 
Answer to Defendants1 First Set of Interrogatories, Answer 27, 
page 65). 
13. Subsequent payments totaling $58,682.00 were made 
to Pioneer and applied to the outstanding balance of $245,163.00 
as follows: 
Date Payment of Wages 
May 4, 1983 $10,000.00 
May 6, 1983 10,000.00 
June 15, 1983 10,000.00 
June 17, 1983 10,000.00 
June 24, 1983 8,682.00 
July 6, 1983 10,000.00 
14. The remaining outstanding balance as of July 6, 
1983 is $186,481.00. (Summary Judgment, para. 8, page 275). 
15. On July 15, 1983, IML filed a Chapter 11 
proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District 
of Utah, and converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding on November 9, 
1984. (Summary Judgment, para. 9, page 275). 
16. Fred S. Rico, President of Pioneer Credit Union, 
served as the Chairman of one of the creditors committees, in 
the Bankruptcy proceedings. Pioneer at first believed that IML 
could survive. (Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories, Answer 21, page 63). 
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17. Pioneer defended an adversary proceeding brought 
by the Bankruptcy Trustee on behalf of IMLf claiming the payroll 
deductions received at the outset of the Chapter 11 case were 
preferences. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed this action and 
held that the payments constituted wages due. (Plaintiff's 
Amended Answers to Defendants1 First Set of Interrogatories, 
Answer 21). 
18. Pioneer made an informal inquiry with the 
Industrial Commission. Pioneer was advised by the Industrial 
Commission that it would not handle the matter and deemed it to 
be a matter for a civil action. (Plaintiff's Amended Answers to 
Defendants' First Set of Interrogatoriesf Answer 22). 
19. Pioneer filed its original Complaint in the 
United States District Court, District of Utah, on or about July 
lf 1986, after it became apparent that recovery from IML was 
unlikely. (Summary Judgment, para. 14f page 277). 
20. The United States District Court on or about 
January 9f 1987, dismissed the federal causes of action for lack 
of jurisdiction, resulting in the dismissail of the pendant state 
claims also being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Summary 
Judgment, para. 14, page 277). 
21. As a result of the defendants' issuing the 
dishonored checks and Pioneer's reliance upon the defendants' 
representations and partial payments, Pioneer has been damaged 
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in the amount of $186,481.00, plus interest at the highest legal 
rate. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: The partial payments made by the defendants on 
the obligation resulted in tolling all applicable statutes of 
limitations to the date of the last payment (July 6, 1983), 
pursuant to §78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Pioneer's filing of its Complaint in the United States District 
Court on or about July 1, 1986, was accomplished within three 
years from the date of the last payment, and therefore, was 
filed timely. 
POINT II: Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended) provides Pioneer one year from the date the United 
States District Court dismissed Pioneer's Complaint for lack of 
federal jurisdiction, (other than upon the merits), to refile 
its Complaint in the State Court. Pioneer refiled its Complaint 
in the State Court within one week of the United States District 
Court's dismissal and therefore, filed timely. 
POINT III; The inclusion of waiver and laches as a 
basis for summary judgment denied Pioneer its constitutional 
right of due process. The defendants did not raise waiver and 
laches as a basis for their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Neither party submitted any affidavits, depositions, admissions 
or filed any memoranda addressing waiver and laches as a basis 
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for summary judgment. As a result, Pioneer has been denied its 
opportunity to present pertinent materials in opposition to said 
basis for summary judgment. 
POINT IV; Actual "in person" notice of dishonored 
checks satisfies the notice requirements of §7-15-1 et seq., 
prior to filing legal action. Section 7-15-2(1) presumes notice 
to be given when written notice is deposited in the United 
States mails. Pioneer instead provided actual "in person" 
verbal notice to the defendantsf providing them an opportunity 
to correct the problem. 
In the alternative, if actual verbal notice is not 
sufficient, failure to provide written notice is merely a 
procedural requirement and Pioneer should have one year from the 
date of this Court's decision to provide written notice and to 
refile its action. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WERE 
TOLLED BY §78-12-44, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
It is the general rule in the State of Utah that "a 
cause of action for a debt begins to run when the debt is due 
and payable because at that time an action can be maintained to 
enforce it." O'Hair v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d 799, 800 (Utah 1970); 
Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah App. 1987). In the 
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present case, it is undisputed that the cause of actions arose 
when payment was denied for each of the three checks for the 
respective payroll periods in February, 1983. It is further 
undisputed that payments on the debt totaling $58,682.00 were 
made by the defendants as managing officers and agents of IML, 
through and including July 6, 1983. 
The statute of limitations pursuant to §78-12-26 or 
78-12-27, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) each establish a 
three year period to file an action. These and all other 
possible statutes of limitations were tolled to the date of the 
last partial payment and acknowledgement of the existing debt 
pursuant to §78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
Section 78-12-44 provides: 
In any case founded on contract, when any 
part of the principal or interest shall have 
been paid, or an acknowledgement of an 
existing liability, debt or claim, or any 
promise to pay the same, shall have been 
made, an action may be brought within the 
period prescribed for the same after such 
payment, acknowledgement or promise; but 
such acknowledgement or promise must be in 
writing, signed by the party to be charged 
thereby. When a right of action is barred 
by the provisions of any statute, it shall 
be unavailable either as a cause of action 
or ground of defense. (emphasis added). 
Interpreting the predecessor to §78-12-44, the Utah 
State Supreme Court, in Holloway v. Wetzel, 45 P.2d 565 (Utah 
1935), held that the partial payment is a reaffirmation on the 
debt due. The Court stated: 
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In the contemplation of a statute, the part 
payment of the debt is regarded as evidence 
of a willingness and obligation to pay the 
residue, as conclusive as would be a 
personal written promise to that effect. 
It could not, then, have been intended to 
give this effect to payments other than 
those made by the party himself, or under 
his immediate* direction. (emphasis added) . 
Holloway v. Wetzel, supra, at page 568. 
This Court, in Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 314 
(Utah App. 1987), held that under Holloway, supra, §78-12-44 
extends a statute of limitations, "only if: (1) partial 
payment of either principal or interest due under the 
settlement agreement was made, (2) by the debtor/obligor of 
the settlement agreement (or by a third party at Gilroy1s 
direction) , and, (3) the payment was made to the creditor 
under the settlement agreement." (emphasis added). 
The Utah State Supreme Court's decision in Holloway, 
supra, and this Court's decision in Butler, supra, establish 
that the partial payments made by the defendants through and 
including July 6, 1983, had the effect of tolling the 
applicable statute of limitations allowing an action to be 
brought within three years same after the final partial payment 
pursuant to §78-12-44 U.C.A. (1953 as amended). The filing of 
the Plaintiff's original Complaint in the United States 
District Court on or about July 1, 1986, was filed within three 




SECTION 78-12-40f UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1953 AS AMENDED) PROVIDES PLAINTIFF ONE 
YEAR TO COMMENCE A NEW ACTION AFTER THE 
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OTHER THAN UPON 
THEIR 
MERITS. 
Subsequent to the Bankruptcy Court's determination 
that the partial payments paid by IML to Pioneer were wage 
payments and therefore not part of the bankruptcy estatef (an 
action brought by the IML Freight, Inc.f Bankruptcy Trustee 
asserting that the amounts paid to the credit union were not 
wages, on behalf of IMLf Pioneer determined that recovery from 
the bankruptcy was unlikely, and therefore filed its original 
Complaint in the Federal District Court of Utah, Central 
Division, on or about July 1, 1986. Said Complaint alleged five 
causes of action including two causes of action under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §201 et. seq.), and three pendent 
state causes of action. The Honorable Judge Jay Thomas Green, 
held that the United States District Court lacked jurisdiction 
on the two federal causes of action, therefore the pendent state 
causes of action also failed for lack of jurisdiction. The 
Order of Dismissal was entered by Judge Green on January 9, 
1987. Pioneer then filed the current complaint in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, on or about January 12, 1987. The filing of the current 
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complaint in the Third District Court, was filed within less 
than one week of the dismissal by the Federal Court. Section 
78-12-40, Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as amended) provided 
Pioneer one year after the dismissal to commence a new action. 
Section 78-12-40, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), states: 
If any action is commenced within due* time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff 
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in 
such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the 
time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the same shall have expired, 
the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause 
of action survives, his representatives, 
may commence a new action within one year 
after the reversal or failure. (Emphasis 
added) 
Discussing the legislative intent behind §78-12-40, 
U.C.A., the Utah State Supreme Court has stated: 
We think, however, that the purpose 
behind the statute is plain and that the 
legislature intended that anyone who had 
a cause in litigation which was 
dismissed for some reason "otherwise 
than upon the merits" should have a 
reasonable time, which is set as one 
year, to reassert an attempt to 
establish his rights in court. 
Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 305 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1956). 
In a fact situation very similar to the present 
case, the Utah State Supreme Court, in Rhoades v. Wright, 622 
P.2d 343 (Utah 1988), held that §78-12-40 extended the time to 
bring a suit to one year after the dismissal of a federal 
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action dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction. Rhoades, 
supra, was a wrongful death action originally filed in the 
United States District Court for Utah, alleging diversity 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the defendants 
under the Utah long arm statute. The Federal Court dismissed 
the action for lack of diversity jurisdiction and subsequently 
dismissed the pendant state claims for lack of federal 
jurisdiction. The plaintiffs then filed an action in Colorado 
which was time-barred under the applicable Colorado statutes. 
The plaintiffs then filed an action in the Utah State District 
Court for San Juan County. The court found that the Federal 
District Court action was dismissed without prejudice for lack 
of jurisdiction and "hence other than on the merits" and that 
the subsequent filing in the Utah District Court was filed 
within one year of that dismissal. The Court held: 
In applying the Utah limitation provision 
for wrongful death actions, a matter 
previously determined by this Court to 
effect the remedy and not the cause of 
action itself, we hold that the Utah 
tolling statute applies and extends the 
time to bring suit to one year after the 
dismissal of the federal action, a 
limitation complied with in this action, 
(emphasis added) 
Rhoades, supra, at page 350. 
The Utah State Supreme Court has had additional 
occasions to discuss §78-12-40, U.C.A., and on each occasion has 
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held that the plaintiff had one year from the dismissal of the 
original complaint, when dismissed "other than upon the merits" 
as was Pioneer's original filing in the United States District 
Court. See: Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352, 
354, (Utah 1980); McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center, 
603 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1979); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 
149 (Utah 1979); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 
1988); and, Dunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1983). 
As the Utah Supreme Court held in Rhoades v. Wright, 
supra, the United States District Court's dismissal of Pioneer's 
Complaint based upon lack of federal jurisdiction, was "other 
than on the merits" invoking the Utah tolling statute, §78-12-4 3 
U.C.A., providing Pioneer one year after the dismissal of tha 
federal action to bring suit in the state court, a limitation 
complied with in this case. Therefore, Pioneer's cause of action 
is not barred by the three year statute of limitations. 
POINT III 
WAIVER AND LACHES WERE NOT BRIEFED OR ARGUED 
BY THE PARTIES AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE A 
BASIS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
upon which the Third Judicial District Court entered it's 
Judgment, moved for Summary Judgment against the first and 
third causes of action set forth in Pioneer's Complaint on the 
basis that Pioneer's claims were barred by applicable statutes 
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of limitations. Neither the defendants or the plaintiff 
raised or addressed any issues concerning whether the 
plaintiff's causes of action were barred by waiver and laches. 
Judge Uno's Minute Entry granting judgment for the 
defendants on their Motion for Summary Judgment states only 
"Based on Pleadings and Memoranda filed, the Court grants 
defendants1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Motion for 
oral argument is denied. Defendant to prepare the Order". 
Judge Uno made no specific findings or drafted any memorandum 
decision. Pursuant to the Court's Minute Entry, counsel for 
the defendant prepared the Order that was entered, which 
includes a basis for Summary Judgment of waiver and laches. 
Plaintiff specifically objected to the inclusion of waiver and 
laches as a basis for Summary Judgment on the Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment. Not withstanding, the Court entered 
the judgment. 
It is well established law in this state that Summary 
Judgment "should not been done on conjecture, but only when the 
matter is clear, and in case of doubt, the doubt should be 
resolved in allowing the challenged party the opportunity of at 
least attempting to prove his right to recover." Duham v. 
Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). "Summary Judgment is 
proper only if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
admissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
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and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of 
factf the doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing 
party." Utah State University v. Sutro and Company, 6 46 P.2d 1..5 
(Utah 1982). 
Although the defendants raised waiver and laches as a 
defense in their Answer, there were no affidavits, deposition;*, 
admissions, or any other pleading or memoranda filed addressi lg 
said defense as a basis for the defendants1 Motion for Parti il 
Summary Judgment. The inclusion of waiver and laches as a basis 
for Summary Judgment has resulted in the denial of Pioneer's 
constitutional right of due process. 
The Utah State Supreme Court has on at least t^o 
occasions had an opportunity to address similar issues involving 
Rule 12(b)(6) Motions. Both cases involved Rule 12(b)(6) Motions 
that also consider matters outside of pleadings and thus treated 
by the District Court as a Motion for Summary Judgment and 
disposed of said Motions as provided in Rule 56. In bcth 
instances the District Court did not provide reasonable 
opportunity to the plaintiff to present all material made 
pertinent in entering a Summary Judgment in favor of the 
defendants and moving parties. In Stran v. Associated Students of 
University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977), the Court held: 
Once the determination is made to consider 
the materials, the mandatory provision of 
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Rule 12(b) controls, vis., all parties 
must be given adequate notice and 
opportunity to submit supporting 
materials, particularly the party 
against whom summary judgment is entered. 
It is error to consider a motion to 
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, 
without giving the adverse party an 
opportunity to present pertinent material. 
The action of the trial court in denying 
the plaintiff the reasonable opportunity 
to present controverting material violated 
the mandate of the Rule. 
Similarly the Utah Supreme Court held in Bekins Bar V 
Ranch v. Utah Farm Production, 587 P.2d 151, 152 (Utah 1978): 
This record does not clearly show that 
plaintiff was given". . . reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent. . ." by a Rule 56 motion for 
summary judgment. 
We hold that it is necessary that the 
record clearly and affirmatively 
demonstrate that when a motion to dismiss 
is made and". . . matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded 
by the court. . ." that all parties 
(including, of course, the non-movant which 
was the plaintiff in this case) are given 
responsible opportunity to present 
additional pertinent material if they wish. 
(Cites omitted). 
In the present case, waiver and laches were never 
plead by the defendants as a basis for their Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. The defendants Memorandum in support of its 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment gave no notice nor addressed 
said issue; no affidavits or memoranda were submitted. 
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Therefore, Pioneer never addressed any claim of waiver and 
laches. To enter a judgment on the basis of waiver and laches 
without providing Pioneer, the responding party, the opportunity 
to present additional pertinent material if they so wished 
violates Pioneer's constitutional right to due process of law. 
POINT IV 
DOES ACTUAL NOTICE SATISFY THE NOTICE 
REQUIREMENTS OF §7-15-1 ET SEQ. , UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED)? 
Pioneer's Third Cause of Action is based on tie 
defendants issuing and delivering checks to Pioneer pursuant :o 
the payroll deduction program, that were dishonored upon 
presentment for insufficient funds. The Cause of Action 
incorporated liability under §7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). Section 7-15-1(1) provides: 
Any person who makes, draws, signs, or 
issues any check, draft, order, or other 
instrument upon any depository institution, 
whether as corporate agent or otherwise, 
for the purpose of obtaining from any 
person, firm, partnership, or corporation 
any money, merchandise, property, or other 
thing of value or paying for any service, 
wages, salary, or rent is liable to the 
holder of the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument if the check, draft, order, or 
other instrument is not honored upon 
presentment and is marked "refer to maker" 
or the account upon which the check, draft, 
order, or other instrument has been made or 
drawn does not exist, has been closed, or 
does not have sufficient funds or 
sufficient credit for payment in full of 
the check, draft, or other instrument, 
(emphasis added). 
-22-
Section 7-15-1(2) Utah Code Annotated establishes that 
"written notice of intent to file civil action" be sent to the 
maker of the dishonored check to "allow the person seven days 
from the date on which the notice is mailed to tender payment in 
fullf plus the service charge imposed for the dishonored check." 
The legislature then, in Section 7-15-2(2) U.C.A., set forth the 
basic form that said notice should take under §7-15-1(2). The 
apparent intent of the legislature in requiring the prelitigation 
notice, as acknowledged by the defendants in their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgmentf page 125, 
"is to provide the makers of dishonored checks an opportunity to 
correct the problem before expensive litigation is commenced." 
In the present case, although Pioneer did not draft written 
notice as set out in §§7-15-1(2) and 7-15-2(2), and deposit it in 
the United States Mails, wherein notice is "conclusively presumed 
to have been given," §7-15-2(1), Pioneer provided actual notice 
"in person" to the defendants, as provided for in §7-15-2(1). 
By way of personal meetings with Mr. Fred S. Rico, 
President of Pioneer Credit Union, the defendants were informed 
that the checks had been dishonored and given the opportunity to 
correct the problem. In response to said actual notice, the 
defendants assured Mr. Rico that the credit union would be paid 
for the dishonored checks, and entered into the payment plan 
resulting in the partial payments received through July 6, 1983. 
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Pioneer believes that it has gone one step beyond the 
requirement set forth in §7-15-1(2) and §7-15-2(2)f by providing 
the defendants with actual notice "in person" rather than merely 
depositing written notice in the United States mail, and having 
notice "conclusively presumed to have been given." Therefore, 
plaintiff's claims against the defendants for the issuance of 
the dishonored checks should not be barred by the notice 
requirements set forth in §7-15-1 and §7-15-2. 
Assuming arguendo, that this Court requires that 
specific compliance with the written notice requirements set 
forth in Sections 7-15-1(2) and 7-15-2(2) be made, said 
requirement is merely procedural and should not result in a 
dismissal of Pioneer's claims upon the merits. The Utah State 
Supreme Court on at least two occasions when the plaintiffs have 
failed to provide written notice as required under the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act, §78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended), has held that such failure was merely a procedural 
defect allowing the plaintiff one year from the date of 
dismissal to provide notice and refile the action. In Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1979), held: 
Section 78-14-8 merely prescribes a 
condition precedent to the filing of a 
summons or a complaint. A failure to 
comply with such conditions does not 
constitute an ajudication on the merits, 
but is merely a procedural defect that 
does not relate to the merits of the basic 
action in any way. 
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The Court again in, Yates v. Vernal Family Health 
Center, 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980), further stated 
"Therefore, pursuant to §78-12-40, appellant has one year from 
the dismissal of that action-or, in this situation, one year from 
the filing of this opinion-in which to bring that action," 
Consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in both Foil v. 
Ballinger, supra, and Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 
supra, should this Court determine that Pioneer in fact failed to 
provide the required notice pursuant to §7-15-1, et. seq., said 
failure to comply is merely a procedural defect and Pioneer has 
one year from the filing of this Court's opinion in which to 
provide notice and refile its action. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court errored in granting the defendants 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment resulting in dismissing all 
of Plaintiff's causes of action. Plaintiff's causes of action 
are not barred by any three year statute of limitation. All 
applicable statutes of limitations were tolled by the partial 
payments made through July 6, 198 3. 
Pioneer's filing of it's Complaint in the United States 
District Court on or about July 1, 1986, constituted a timely 
filing. The subsequent dismissal by the Federal District Court 
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for lack of federal jurisdiction on the federal and pendant state 
claims is other than upon the merits, and pursuant to §78-12-40, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) Pioneer had one year fron 
the date of the dismissal to commence a new action. 
The trial court's inclusion of of waiver and laches is 
not supported by any pleadings, memoranda or affidavit thereby 
denying Pioneer its constitutional right to due process whe 1 
included in the Summary Judgment. 
The notice requirements under §7-15-1, et. seq., wera 
satisfied by the actual notice given to defendants by Pioneer 
during conversations with Pioneer's President, Fred S. Rico. Ii 
the alternative, failure to strictly comply with the conditions 
set forth in §7-15-1, et. seq., is merely a procedural defect 
whereby, pursuant to §78-12-40, Pioneer will have one year from 
the date of this Court's filing of its opinion, to provide 
written notice and refile its complaint. 
Therefore, the precise relief sought by plaintiff, 
Pioneer Credit Union, is that the Summary Judgment in favor cf 
the defendants, be reversed and the case be remanded to tire 
District Court. 
DATED this /j^ day of June, 1990. 
RICHARDS, BIESINGER, WOLFERT & NEFF 
S^^WUSl (^^J^du^c^ • 
L. R I C H A R D S 7 
L. TASMAN BIESINGER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Pioneer Credit Union 
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CHAPTER 13 
SAVINGS AND LOAN ACT 
(Repealed by Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 1; 1977, 
ch. 19, § 8; 1981, ch. 16, § 1.) 
7-13-1 to 7-13-74. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 14 
CREDIT INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
Section 
7-14-1. Definitions. 
7-14-2. Legislative findings. 
7-14-3. Information an institution may furnish. 
7-14-4. Immunity from liability. 
7-14-5. Reciprocal exchange of information autho-
rized. 
7-14-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Depository institution" means any institu-
tion authorized by state or federal law to accept 
and hold demand deposits or other accounts 
which may be used to effect third party payment 
transactions. The definition of "depository insti-
tution" in Chapter 1 does not apply to Chapter 4 
[14]. 
(2) "Credit reporting agency" includes any co-
operative credit reporting agency maintained by 
an association of financial institutions or one or 
more associations of merchants. lssi 
,7-14-2. Legislative findings. 
-The substantial financial loss to the state and to 
trade and commerce"withinlthis'state resulting from 
the dishonor or other return of checks, drafts, or other 
orders for the payment of money, including transac-
tions to be consummated by electronic means, re-
quires concerted effort by financial institutions to at-
tempt to minimize the number of such occurrences. 
The Legislature finds that to facilitate such concerted 
effort adequate protection against liability of the par-
i-itf^ina+imcr fi«ori**Jol i n a + i t i i t i n n a ia n a M t a a a r v . lOAi" 
7-14-3. Information an institution may furnish. 
^ A n y institution doing business in the state may 
report to any other financial institution, or credit re-
porting agency the following: (1) that an account 
maintained to effect third party payment transac-
tions has been closed out by the institution, the rea-
sons therefor, and the identity of the depositor or ac-
count holder; (2) upon the request of another finan-
cial institution any other information in the files of 
the institution relating to the credit experience of the 
reporting institution with respect to a particular per-
son as to whom inquiry is made; and (3) any informa-
tion concerning attempted or potential activity to de-
fraud a financial institution or to obtain funds from a 
financial institution by fraudulent or other unlawful 
means or other information relating to individuals 
sought by law enforcement authorities for alleged vi-
olations of criminal laws. isei 
7-14-4. Immunity from liability. 
r.No depository institution making any report or 
communication of information authorized by this 
chapter shall be liable to any person for disclosing 
such information to any recipient authorized to re-
ceive this information under this chapter, or for any 
error or omission in such report or communication. 
1981 
7-14-5. Reciprocal exchange of information nn 
thorized. 
One or more financial institutions may jointly 
agree with one or more other financial institutions 
for the reciprocal exchange of any information authc? 
rized to be reported by the provisions of this chapter! 
Such reciprocal exchange of information or the acts or 
refusals to act of one or more recipients because of 
such information shall not constitute a boycott of 
blacklist, or otherwise be a basis for liability to any 
person on the part of any participant in the reciprocal 





7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer — Notice of action 
— Collection costs. 
7-15-2. Notice — Form. 
7-15-3. Liability of financial institution upon 
wrongful dishonor. 
7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer—Notice of action 
—. Collection costs. 
£ j l ) Any person who makes, draws, signs, or issues 
any check, draft, order, or other instrument upon air? 
Repository institution, whether as corporate agent or 
oth«srwteer for the purpose of oblaining from any per| 
son,J firm, partnership, or corporation any money' 
merchandise, property, or other thing of value or pay-
ing for any service, wages, salaj-y, or rent is liable Jo 
the holder of the check, draft, order, or other instriv-
ment if the check, draft, order, or other instrument is 
not honored upon presentment and is marked "refer 
to maker" or the account upon which the check, draft, 
order, or other instrument has been made or drawn' 
does not exist, has been closed, or does not have suffi-
cient funds or sufficient credit for payment in full of 
the check, draft, or other instrument . -:- z: ;A^ j ^ ^ T h e holder of the check, draft, order, or other^ 
instrument which has been dishonored may give 
written or verbal notice of dishonor to the person" 
making, drawing, signing, or issuing the check, draft, 
order, or otherjnstrument and may impose a service 
cnarge that may not exceed $15. Prior to filing an' 
action based upon this section, the holder of a dishon-
ored check, draft, order, or other instrument shall 
give the person making, drawing, signing, or issuing 
the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instru-
ment written notice of intent to file civil action, al-
lowing the person seven days from the date on which 
the notice was mailed to tender payment in full, plus 
the service charge imposed for the dishonored check, 
draft, order, or other instrument. 
(3) In a civil action, the person making, drawing, 
signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument is liable to the holder for. 
(a) the amount of the check, draft, order, or 
other instrument; 
(b) interest; and 
(c) all costs of collection, including all court 
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
(4) As used in this section, "costs of collection" in-
cludes reasonable compensation, as approved by the 
court, for time expended if the collection is pursued 
personally by the holder and not through an agent 
1968 
iyv FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 7-16-2* 
7-15-2. Notice — Form, 
(1) "Notice" means notice given to the person mak-
ing, drawing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or 
other instrument either in person or in writing. A 
written notice is conclusively presumed to have been 
given when properly deposited in the United States 
mails, postage prepaid, by certified or registered 
mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to the 
signer at his address as it appears on the check, draft, 
order, or other instrument or at his last-known ad-
dress. 
(2) Written notice as applied in Subsection 
7-15-1(2) shall take substantially the following form: 
Date: 
To: 
You are hereby notified that the check(s) described 





Reason for dishonor (marked on instrument): 
This instrument, together with a service charge of 
$15 must be paid to the undersigned within seven 
days from the date of this notice in accordance with 
Section 7-15-l,JUtah Code Annotated 1953, or appro-
priate civil legal action may be filed against you for 
the amount due and owing together with service 
charges, interest, court costs, attorneys' fees, and ac-
tual costs of collection as provided by law. 
%,ln addition, £he criminal code provides in Section 
J7j?^5?5» JJtah Code Annotated 1953 that any person 
who* issues or ^ passes a check fcr"thewpayment of 
money, for the purpose of obteming from any person, 
fim/partnership,"or corporation^ any paoney, prop-
erty,'~or othjer^thing'of value or paying for any ser-
vices,'wages, salary, labor, for rent, knowing it will 
not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by 
the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check. 
The civil action referred to in this notice does not 
preclude the right to prosecute under the criminal 
[code of the state of Utah. 
(Signed) 
Name of Holder: 




7-15-3. Liability of financial institution u o o n 
wrongful dishonor. 
HOT a person'is liable to a holder under Section 
7-15-1, and the liability is proximately caused by a 
financial institution's wrongful dishonor under Sec-
tion 70A-4-402, any award against the financial insti-
tution under Section 70A-4-402 shall include, but not 
be limited to, all amounts awarded against the person 
to the holder under Section 7-15-1. 1968 
CHAPTER 16 





7-16-3. Application of act — Restrictions on use of 
facilities. 
7-16-4 to 7-16-8. Repealed. 
. 7-16-9. Authority to make facilities available to in-
stitutions in contiguous states and to 
Section 
connect with regional or national sys-
tems. 
7-16-10. Contractual waiver of Uniform Commer-
cial Code provisions. 
7-16-11 to 7-16-18. Repealed. 
7-16-19. Installation and operation of automatic 
teller machine — Notice — Approval or 
disapproval by commissioner — Restric-
tions. 
7-16-1. Repealed. 1965 
7-16-2* Definitions. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Automated teller machine" means an un-
manned, free-standing electronic information 
processing device, located separate and apart 
from a financial institution's principal office, 
branch, or detached facility, which uses either 
the direct transmission of electronic impulses to 
a financial institution or the recording of elec-
tronic impulses or other indicia of a transaction 
for delayed transmission to a financial institu-
tion in order to perform financial transactions. 
(2) "Point-of-sale terminal" means a manned 
electronic information processing device, other 
lhan a telephone, located at the point of sale and 
separate and apart from a financial institution's 
principal office, '"branch,~kor detached facility, 
which uses either the direct transmission of elec-
tronic impulses to a financial institution or the 
recording of,electronic impulses "or other indicia 
bf a transaction for delayed,transmission to a fi-
nancial institution in order to perform financial 
^transactions.' However,' "point-of-sale terminals 
^includes electronic information^ processing de-
vices which interface with the telephone trans-
mission system and which^either through the 
direct transmission of electronic impulses or the 
recording and delayed transmission of electronic 
impulses to a financial institution, perform fi-
nancial transactions. Nothing in this definition 
prevents a device which constitutes a point-of-
sale terminal from being used to perform, for its 
operator, any internal business functions that 
ws**iiot ffomTifiw? transactions. **•&* - -
ft* (3) "Financial transaction'' means cash with-
drawals, deposits, account transfers, payments 
from deposit, loan or thrift accounts, disburse-
m1enta~ander~a ^reauthorized credit agreement, 
or loan payments and other similar transactions 
initiated by an account holder. ' 
J
* (4) "Consumer funds transfer facility" means 
either an automated teller machine, or a point-of-
sale terminal, including any supporting equip-
ment, structures, or systems. A point-of-sale ter-
minal owned or operated by and on the premises 
of a person primarily engaged in the business of 
selling or leasing goods or non-financial services 
and capable of performing the functions of a con-
sumer funds transfer facility, is not considered to 
be a consumer funds transfer facility unless con-
nected on-line or off-line to a financial institution 
for the purpose of performing financial transac-
tions. 
(5) "Merchant" means a person primarily en-
gaged m the retail sale or lease of goods or non-
financial services. 
(6) "Control" means ownership, directly or in-
directly, of a majority of the outstanding shares 
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